### Off

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater or reduce—to bring to an inferior state

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

####  If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

#### Swing states are narrowing- Romney moderate platform narrowing the gap

AP 10/9 Obama, Romney focus on swing-state Ohio as race tightens¶ Romney's shift toward more moderate positions apparently narrowing the gap with Obama¶ The Associated Press ¶ Posted: Oct 9, 2012 10:41 AM ET http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/10/09/us-election-president-campaign-obama-romney.html

With swinging polls making the White House race as unpredictable as ever, President Barack Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney were crossing Ohio Tuesday and making their case with new urgency in the campaign's final weeks.¶ Obama maintains more paths to victory, but polling shows a tightening race after more than 67 million people watched Romney shine in their debate in Denver last week. The challenger's math is extremely narrow, particularly without Ohio. No Republican has won the presidency without carrying the state.¶ Based on the presumed outcome of the 41 non-battleground states and Washington, D.C., Obama enters the final period banking on 237 electoral votes. Romney is assured of 191.¶ On the road to the 270 electoral votes needed to win the presidency, nine battleground states — Ohio, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Virginia, North Carolina and Colorado — account for the final 110 votes. ¶ Both Democrats and Republicans say internal campaign surveys after last week's debate show Romney cut into the lead Obama had built in many key battleground states. But they say Obama still has an advantage in most of them.¶ The two candidates Tuesday were focusing on Ohio, where Obama had opened a lead before the debate. Romney also planned stops there in four of the next five days. Romney adviser Charlie Black said the Republican's rise to even with Obama, and even leading, in national polls suggests naturally that he has closed on Obama in Ohio, too.¶ "I promise you, he's back in the game in Ohio," Black said.¶ A Republican familiar with some of Romney's polling says internal polls before last Wednesday showed Obama with 5-point leads in Ohio and Virginia. In Ohio, Romney was winning in conservative congressional districts before the debate, but only by 1 or 2 percentage points instead of the 5 or 6 points he would need to carry the state. But post-debate, Romney has opened a 5-point lead in those districts in internal polling, according to the Republican who spoke on condition of anonymity without authorization to publicly discuss the polls.¶ Romney Adviser Kevin Madden said Romney will focus on plans to bring back manufacturing jobs in Ohio, drawing clear contrasts with Obama on issues that effect that sector such as energy, health care and tax reform.¶ "We still believe that this is going to be a campaign that is very close," Madden told reporters traveling aboard Romney's campaign plane. "But we do see a lot of enthusiasm from a lot of our core supporters and we see a lot of undecided voters that are taking a new look at Gov. Romney."¶ In Iowa, Romney appeared at a farm and outlined agricultural policy changes he would make, including tax relief for farmers and easing of environmental regulations that make it harder for them to do their job. He encouraged his supporters to

#### **Wind power popular in swing states**

Danko ’12 Republicans care more about production tax credits when they see local jobs on the line.¶ EARTHTECHLING, PETE DANKO: AUGUST 1, 2012¶ Romney’s Anti-Wind Stance: A Swing State Problem? http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Romneys-Anti-Wind-Stance-A-Swing-State-Problem/

Nobody would argue that there are great masses of voters across the land staking their presidential votes on how Mitt Romney and Barack Obama stand on the [production tax credit](http://www.earthtechling.com/tag/production-tax-credit/) for wind power. But there might be a few in some key states -- and those voters now have a clear choice on the issue.¶ The [Romney campaign](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Candidate-Romneys-Energy-Plan/) came out Monday firmly against extending the [PTC](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wind-without-its-tax-credit-this-bleeding-has-to-stop/), seen by the industry as vital to its continued growth and supported by a number of Republicans in states where wind power has been a jobs booster.¶ One of those Republicans is Rep. Tom Latham, whose state of [Iowa](http://www.earthtechling.com/tag/iowa/) has become the No. 2 wind power producer in the U.S. and a [center for wind power manufacturing](http://www.earthtechling.com/2012/03/more-wind-power-and-more-work-for-iowa/).¶ “I’m disappointed that the statement by Governor Romney’s spokesperson shows a lack of full understanding of how important the wind energy tax credit is for Iowa and our nation,” [Latham said in a statement](http://latham.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=305138) released soon after the Romney camp’s declaration of opposition. "It’s the wrong decision. Wind energy represents one of the most innovative and exciting sectors of Iowa’s economy. Nearly 7,000 hardworking Iowans are employed by over 250 businesses associated with the wind energy industry in our state. [...] I invite Governor Romney to step forward and re-evaluate the statement issued by his campaign spokesman.”¶ The “statement” referenced was made Monday by Shawn McCoy, a spokesman for[Romney’s Iowa campaign](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Candidate-Romneys-Energy-Plan/) in Iowa, [who told the Des Moines Register](http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/07/30/lines-now-drawn-on-wind-tax-credit-romney-opposes-it-obama-favors-it/) that Romney “will allow the wind credit to expire, end the stimulus boondoggles, and create a level playing field on which all sources of energy can compete on their merits.”¶ President Obama has been a strong advocate for the tax credit. Despite having what qualifies in Washington these days as [bipartisan support](http://www.earthtechling.com/2012/02/republicans-the-wind-power-saviors/), efforts by wind power proponents to extend the credit beyond its Dec. 31 expiration have stalled in the Senate, where [the requirement of 60 votes to pass legislation](http://www.earthtechling.com/2012/04/ptc-passage-made-easy-buy-off-the-republicans/) has proved insurmountable. The credit, worth 2.2 cents for every kilowatt-hour of power produced, generally has run for two-year cycles, but hasn’t been allowed to expire since 2004.¶ Every time the tax credit has expired, the wind industry [has gone into virtual hibernation](http://www.earthtechling.com/2011/12/study-supports-wind-tax-credit-extension/) -- and that’s the forecast again from the American Wind Energy Association. It says 37,000 jobs could be lost if the [PTC](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wind-without-its-tax-credit-this-bleeding-has-to-stop/) doesn’t gain an extension, and soon.¶ The PTC might seem an unlikely player in a national election focused on the state of the economy, but in what could be harrowingly tight states, even shifting a very small percentage of votes could make a real difference. That’s because in some states -- such as Iowa, for instance -- wind is seen as a jobs issue, and it’s very popular: Public Opinion Strategies, which polls for Republican candidates, reported recently [[PDF](http://awea.org/issues/state_policy/upload/Iowa-Statewide-Memo.pdf)] that in the Hawkeye State, “More than half of voters (57 percent), including 41 percent of Republicans and 59 percent of Independents, would be less likely to vote for a candidate for president if that candidate did not support expanding American wind power generation.”¶ Colorado is another swing state where a strong anti-wind stand like [Romney’s](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Candidate-Romneys-Energy-Plan/) could be a factor. There, the Denver Post [noted](http://blogs.denverpost.com/thespot/2012/07/30/romney/77572/) Monday that Vestas has said it would likely be forced to lay off most of its Colorado workers -- 1,700 people at facilities in Brighton, Windsor and Pueblo -- if the tax credit isn’t extended. In Colorado, like Iowa, support for wind is bipartisan; Republican Reps. Cory Gardner and Scott Tipton have both [come out in favor of the PTC](http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/02/ptc-update-colorado-iowa-delegations-offer-support-as-wind-industry-hits-the-hill).

#### Energy key election issue.

Skorobogatov 12. [Yana, intern @ StateImpact Texas – a collaboration of public radio stations focused on environmental and energy issues coordinated by NPR,“Poll: Consumers favor domestic energy production, natural gas” State Impact -- April 10 -- http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/04/10/poll-consumers-favor-domestic-energy-production-natural-gas/]

Americans will likely take their views on energy issues to the voting booth this November, according to a new national poll by The University of Texas at Austin. The survey found that 65 percent of respondents considered energy to be an important presidential issue.

#### **Obama re-election = Israel abandonment**

Richer ’12 War With Iran Imminent Because President Obama is Not Fond of Israel¶ Stephen Richer is a director at a legal and regulatory policy think tank in Washington, DC. He's the president of RK Research, a group that studies, among other things, American youth political behavior. More of his work can be found at [www.StephenRicher.com](http://www.StephenRicher.com). 2/12/12 http://www.policymic.com/debates/5264/war-with-iran-imminent-because-president-obama-is-not-fond-of-israel

The Iran debate is heating up for at least three reasons: 1) Iran’s nuclear program, as reported by IAEA, has picked up steam in recent months; 2) The 2012 U.S. presidential election is only eight months away; and 3) Iran is increasingly internationally isolated.¶ Accordingly, a number of experts at this week’s [AIPAC Policy Conference](http://www.aipac.org/pc) informally bet me that if the current course isn’t altered, Israel will strike Iran’s nuclear sites before the year is out. I’ll make the same bet.¶ Iran’s nuclear program is now a serious threat. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently listed its Iranian nuclear concerns in a 15-page document that included: the computer modeling of a nuclear warhead; the enrichment of 240 pounds of uranium at 20 percent; the addition of hundreds of new centrifuges to a mountain facility; and the sudden disappearance of 45 pounds of uranium metal, previously at a research lab. IAEA can hardly be accused of being an agent of American and Israeli suspicions, so these claims cannot be dismissed by even the most skeptical. The Israelis will strike before Iran gets a nuclear weapon, and that time looks increasingly near.¶ Concerning the U.S. presidential election, President Obama’s attitude toward Israel is a heavily debated matter. I’ll refer you to this 30-minute documentary by the Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI) titled “[Daylight: The Story of Obama and Israel](http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=daylight&oq=daylight&aq=f&aqi=g4&aql=&gs_sm=3&gs_upl=3373683l3375693l0l3376110l8l8l0l4l4l0l105l364l3.1l4l0)” for a bit of evidence that the relationship is weak. And I’ll simply add my two cents by paraphrasing Hamlet: “Methinks the President doth protest too much.” If President Obama is really such a good friend of Israel, then why does he always need to explain and defend himself? It’s not just that he’s a Democrat; President Clinton didn’t get this treatment.¶ If we accept that President Obama is less-than-super-fond of Israel, then we have another reason for an eminent Iranian climax. The Israelis must strike Iran while President Obama can still be held electorally accountable by the American people and the Republican Party. If Israel strikes during Obama’s second term, then he is free to chastise Israel, as I suspect he would, and abandon Israel as an ally.¶ A third, and my final, explanation for the “heating up” of the Iranian debate is the civil strife in Syria. If Syria falls on its sword, Iran will have no steadfast allies. Knowing this, Iran is increasingly anxious to equip itself to exist as an international pariah (along the lines of North Korea), and the Western world is similarly anxious to enact outside measures that might weaken the regime and encourage Iranian citizens to extend the Arab spring to Persia.¶ All told, it’s no surprise that the word “Iran” came up once every 30 seconds at this year's AIPAC Policy Conference. Given the conflux of the above three points, Iran is likely to erupt in the coming months, and it will undoubtedly be the most important topic in international affairs in 2012.

#### Samson Option collapses global ag — Billions die

**Dafinoiu 2011** (David Dafinoiu, president and co-founder at NorAm Intelligence, May 26, 2011, “The ‘Arab Spring’, the ‘Samson Option’ and ‘Arab Fall’,” NorAm, http://noramintel.com/the-%E2%80%9Carab-spring%E2%80%9D-the-coming-%E2%80%9Cnuclear-winter%E2%80%9D-the-israeli-%E2%80%9Csamson-option%E2%80%9D-and-the-coming-global-economy-disaster/)

Israel is becoming surrounded by mad regimes and is about to face total Islamic hysteria. Asians and Europeans still consider Israel a “state” of the US. Protesters in the capitals of the Islamic world call for “Death to Israel…death to the Jews”. Memories of the 40’s in Germany have faded. The new Egyptian Nazi party is increasingly successful recruiting the young with no memories or texts to remind them. With the pending arrival of the Turkish flotilla at the Gaza strip sea border in mid-June, Israel will witness the circle of its enemies – Turkey, Syria, Iran and their puppets in Lebanon and Gaza – unite with the revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan. This is a formidable alliance, even for Israel, without the support of the West or the EU. At best, Israel may feel the silent indifference of the West. At worst, they will hear the ever-closer shouts of triumph and jeering at their now porous borders. The next Holocaust will morph from abstraction to possibility to reality. As Israel stands alone, it will then have only two options: to die without a fight, or to be lost after vanquishing their enemies. The choice is die or fight. The Israelis have prepared for this moment. Should Israel be attacked and her borders become indefensible…the plan is referred to as “The Samson Option.” The Israelis will fight hard. They will be smarter and more clever. They will have more tools of war but they will ultimately fail without Western support. Ultimately, sheer numbers will prevail. Now, the time comes. What will Israel do? Mr. Obama believes that Israel will choose the first option…to die without a fight. If only he were a student of history. Considering the tragic and painful history of Jews, from Maccabeus and Jerusalem’s zealots to the Warsaw ghetto and the Six-Day War…Mr. Obama is wrong. In this case there will be no outside observers to tell the story for future generations… Israel begins its methodical plan. In its first phase of the preemptive strike, Israel will hit the Egyptian “Aswan High Dam” with nuclear weapons. The dam holds a massive 111 cubic kilometers of water. When the power of this water is released, half of the population of Egypt will be washed in the Mediterranean Sea within hours. The water would travel fast in the valley, giving very small warning to the population down the river. For the survivors there will be nothing but a featureless land covered with many feet of mud. No homes…no food…no arable land…no water conduits…no power…very few cars/trucks/trains/airplanes. 99% of the population of Egypt will feel the power of the water…and the rage of the Israelis. They will be gone. The Israeli strategists consider that after this attack, the other Middle East nations will pause and reconsider their options. But now Israel will move into Phase Two of the strike…launching the “Samson Option”…Israel’s Preemptive Nuclear Strike on Iran. It is now October. The oil production from the Middle East drops to near zero due to the nuclear conflict. Agricultural production worldwide is heavily dependent on oil production…fuel for the machines, fertilizers, and refrigeration. Following a ME war (that includes nuclear weapons), oil production is massively curtailed and this, in turn, leads to unprecedented reductions in worldwide agricultural production. The result? Mass starvations…think in the billions.

### Off

#### Wind rapidly expanding in the SQ – will revitalize rural areas

American Wind Energy Association 2012 http://www.awea.org/issues/state\_policy/index.cfm

Wind energy enjoys broad public support and can be a fundamental part of state economic development strategies. With the right policy support, wind power can grow to provide 20% of the United States' electricity, and in doing so, support 500,000 American jobs. The U.S. Department of Energy's 20% wind energy by 2030 scenario shows that rural land owners would earn more than $600 million a year through land lease payments that range from $2,000 to $4,000 per megawatt annually, and rural communities would see increases of as much as $1.5 billion annually in property tax revenues that can be allocated to fund schools, infrastructure, medical centers, and other public services.

#### Their plan uniquely trades off with NON-urban windfields – they uniquely PROTECT “pristine” environments, meaning they undermine vulnerability and thus link turn all of their Butler cards – the trade off is unique because the perception of brownfield blight means they don’t disrupt anything which is perceived as “natural” or “pristine”

Yale Environment 360 2011 http://blog.cleantechies.com/2011/06/24/brown-to-green-a-new-use-for-blighted-industrial-sites/

“It’s an untapped opportunity to not just deliver cleanup to some of these contaminated or previously contaminated sites, but to recycle our industrial legacy in making progress toward a cleaner energy future,” said Chase Huntley, a policy advisor on energy and climate change for the nonprofit Wilderness Society. Huntley’s group is interested in preserving the country’s remaining wild lands, and every solar or wind project that rises from an industrial wasteland is one that won’t be built on a pristine ridgeline or tract of desert. Another plus is that public opposition to renewable energy projects on blighted land is highly unlikely.

#### Their solvency is predicated on windfarms in NON-Urban areas, where they can disrupt the fantasy of a unified nature – this is their internal link author from wind to vulnerability

Morton 10 (Timothy Morton, Professor and Rita Shea Guffey Chair in English at Rice University, 2010, The Ecological Thought, pp 9-10) lm

You could see turbines as environmental art. Wind chimes play in the wind; some environmental sculptures sway and rock in the breeze. Wind farms have a slightly frightening size and magnificence. One could easily read them as embodying the aesthetics of the sublime (rather than the beautiful). But it’s an ethical sublime that says, “We humans choose not to use carhon”—a choice visible in gigantic turbines. Perhaps it’s this very visibility of choice that makes wind farms disturbing: visible choice, rather than secret pipes, running under an apparently undisturbed landscape” (a word for a painting, not actual trees and water). As a poster in the office of Mulder in the television series The X-Files used to read, “The Truth Is Out There.” Ideology isn’t just in your head. It’s in the shape of a Coke bottle. it’s in the way some things appear “natural—rolling hills and greenery—as if the Industrial Revolution had never occurred. These fake landscapes are the original greenwashing. What the Scots are saying, in objecting to wind farms, isn’t “Save the environment!” but “Leave our dreams undisturbed!” 1f you’re a parent, you will understand our resistance to cleaning things up. Ecology talks about areas of life that we find annoying, boring, and embarrassing. Art can help us, because it’s a place in our culture that deals with intensity, shame, abjection, and loss. It also deals with reality and un realir) being and seeming. If ecology is about radical coexistence, then we must challenge our sense of what is real and what is unreal, what counts as existent and what counts as nonexistent. The idea of Nature as a holistic, healthy, real thing avoids this challenge. Ve must face some puzzling questions. Vhat is an environment? Is there such a thing as the environment? Is it everything “around” us? At what point do we stop, if at all, drawing the line between environment and non cmironmenr: The atmosphere? Earth’s gravitational field? Earth’s magnetic field, without which everything would be scorched by solar winds? The sun, without which we wouldn’t be alive at all? The Galaxy? Does the en vironment include or exclude us? Is it natural or artificial, or both? Can we put it in a conceptual box? Might the word environment be the wrong word? Em’ironment, the upgrade of Nnure, is fraught with difficulty. This is ironic, since what we often call the environment is being changed, degraded, and eroded (and destroyed) by global forces of industry and capitalism. Just when we need to know what it is, it’s disappearing.

#### Rural economies are key to national economy – provides food security and exports

USDA 9

 (“THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: WORKING FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES”, http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA\_ARRA\_RD\_Report\_v10\_LoRes.pdf, Acc: 8/2/12, og)

Rich in history and strong in character, rural communities are essential to our Nation’s future. Rural America comprises more than 70% of the area of the United States and is home to more than 50 million people.1 Figure 1 Rural Urban Classification by County A vibrant American economy depends on a prosperous rural America. Home to our Nation’s agricultural industry, rural America supplies a healthy and abundant source of food for our country and the world, and it is also a vital contributor to employment and exports from the United States. While many sectors of our economy are running trade deficits, American agriculture has enjoyed a trade surplus for nearly 50 years. America’s farmers and ranchers are the most productive in the world, and this productivity supports the strength and prosperity of our Nation as a whole.

#### Economic crisis causes war and great power transitions

Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

### Off

#### The affs use of the political as the background for their ethical action is the ultimate unethical act

Adam Thurschwell (Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University) 2003 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1193

Thus, as Derrida puts it, "ethics enjoins a politics and a law ... . but the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts ... ." n26 No determinate content issues from the ethical demand because ethics, in Derrida's (and Levinas's) sense, is non-normative. To derive a legal or political rule of decision from one's ethical responsibility would be, paradoxically, to displace that responsibility onto a "calculation," and thus would itself be unethical precisely to the extent that it relieves one of further responsibility for the decision in any given case. Ethics therefore demands a legal/political decision that can only rest on something like a "mystical foundation," n27 since such a decision cannot be founded on any determinable rules, reasons or values without abandoning its claim to ethical status. Accordingly, the legal/political decision can only be "determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts" n28 - which is to say, determined on the basis of something that resembles pure faith.

#### Alternative –Reject the affirmatives displacement of their ethical commitment on outside institutions but embrace the individual ethical responsibility embodied within the 1AC

#### Their focus on the atrocities that the government creates because of things like subsidies ignores and trades off with recognizing our own personal complicity with violence. Only by refusing to make statements like “the United States Federal Government should” allows us to transform our own personal will to violence that is the root of their impacts

Susanne Kappeler (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) 1995 The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens — even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### Off

#### Text: The fifty states and all relevant United States territories should offer to accept all liability imposed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act for the production and construction of wind projects on Brownfields.

#### States solve wind

NREL 2011 (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 25, 2011, “State Policies Key to Clean Energy Development, Report Says,” http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2011/973.html)

States’ policies are important to solar and wind energy development and in reducing energy use says a new report from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The findings are in report, State of the States 2010: The Role of Policy in Clean Energy Market Transformation.¶ “This report shows the importance of the state and local policy in encouraging clean energy market development,” said Mike Pacheco, NREL vice president of Deployment & Market Transformation. “Specifically, state policymakers may be more effective at driving clean energy investment using a suite of policies and keeping the policies in place longer.”¶ Building on an emerging body of literature identifying connections between state policy and renewable energy, the State of States 2010 report quantifies the connection between state clean energy policies, renewable energy development and actual reductions in energy use. Renewable energy use increased 3 percent across the United States in 2010, the report says.¶ It is the first time energy efficiency has been considered in this type of analysis, and the report shows significant connections between reduced energy use and building codes, electricity prices and, in some cases, energy efficiency resource standards. Even though state policies might apply to a wide variety of renewable energy resources, the analysis shows that most often there’s a relationship between policy and solar and wind development. So, if states tailor policy to other resources, it might help increase development of renewable energy sources in addition to solar and wind.¶ “State policy efforts can help sustain the good work started by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in creating economic development opportunities through clean energy,” said LeAnn M. Oliver, DOE Weatherization & Intergovernmental Program Manager. “State of the States 2010 offers practical information to policymakers on how to further promote those policies.”

#### The Aff use of state fiat embodies a flawed methodology of centralization. gives credence to the lie that allows government to strip individuals control

John **Papworth** May 14, **2007** "People’s Power for Peace" <http://gandhifoundation.org/2007/05/14/people%e2%80%99s-power-for-peace-by-john-papworth/>

The Mahatma was not opposed to technology, was not his spinning wheel one example of it? But he wanted people to use and control technology for the supreme moral ends of human betterment; he did not want technology to use people for ends that were merely mercenary and of benefit only to a minority. He saw khadi and other village industries as not simply a mean of relieving village poverty and making life decent and tolerable for millions, he saw it as a means of enhancing village power and reducing state power, so that village moral options would play their own part in the political process. It is one of the great tragedies of the 20th century that the significance of this aspect of his teaching has been almost completely overlooked by those who have sought to promote change under the banner of ‘peace’. They have made the error of assuming that in human affairs the shortest distance between two points is a straight line: that peace could be achieved with knee- jerk reactions to any moves towards war made by governments, that if only enough people would read enough peace literature, join enough peace organisations, attend enough peace conferences and peace rallies, even if they were only talking and meeting with each other, one day, somehow or other, ‘peace’ would prevail. One reason for this confusion arises from our readiness to accept that because each of us has a vote perhaps half a dozen times in a lifetime, that gives us control of the giant machinery of political power and that we are thereby entitled to assume it is our moral options which prevail and that our form of government is therefore democratic. This is one of the most momentous illusions of the modern era and has done more to destroy the effectiveness of the peace movement than any other factor. The meaning of the word ‘democracy’ is based on the concept that people control the power of government, what prevails today is the exact opposite; it is the power of government which now controls people. The reason for this stems from our failure to see the force of Aristotle’s remark: “To the size of a state there is a limit, as there is to plants, animals, and implements for none of these retain their natural facility when they are too large”. Rousseau made much the same point: The more the state is enlarged the more freedom is diminished. It is an illusion based on a failure to absorb the elementary arithmetic of power; that the smaller the political unit the bigger the significance of the individual member, contrawise the larger the political unit the smaller the significance of the individual: so that, for example, a unit of just two persons, each having the right to vote of course, means that each person has one half of the power: a unit of 100 means each has one hundredth, a million yields a one millionth. The UK has around 50 million voters, and if one 50 millionth of the share of governing power may give cause for discontent just think of the luckless inhabitant of the democratic Chinese paradise enjoying about one and a third billionth of power! Why do these numbers matter? Because as the size of the unit increases and the power of the individual diminishes, where then does the power go? The answer is, to the centre. The mere factor of growth itself transfers power from the individual to central government, and the bigger the unit the more power the centre is able to wield. But, a voice will object, the people control the government with their votes. It is a theoretical objection based on an illusion. The voters may elect the persons who govern, but on a mass scale is quite unable to control what they do. This is why we are in the midst of the greatest crisis of civilisation that has confronted humanity in all its history, for once in power the leaders control policy decisions, they control appointments, patronage, the power to influence the media, taxation, foreign relations, the power to make war, even the power to destroy the country’s very identity by submerging it in a federation of other mass powers. The voters may be aghast at what is happening, but on a mass scale all they can do is to vote into power another mass party leadership of different personalities which will tend to have almost identical policies.

### case

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Ontology does not come first.

David Owen Millennium Journale of international studies 2002 “Re-Orientation Internatioal Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theoryto recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.

#### Epistemology doesn’t indict observations of material reality

Wendt 2000 (Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security and PolSci, Ohio State, 2000 On the Via Media, Review of International Studies 26)

In the book I argue that, compared to ontology-talk, the value of epistemology talk for a discipline like IR is considerably less than something as imposing as the third ‘Great Debate’ might suggest. What matters more is what there is, not how we can know it, since we clearly do know things, and the ‘how’ of this knowledge will necessarily vary with the many different kinds of questions we ask in our field, and the varied tools at our disposal for answering them.

#### Rejection of politics and the idea of world-changing denies life. Attempts at changing the world are prerequisites and lead to new forms of life that their evidence doesn’t assume – our embrace of the political is the only way to embrace vulnerability productively

Todd **May** (professor of philosophy at Clemson University) **2005** “To Change the World, To Celebrate Life” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Sage Publications

And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren’t in Tibet, even if they aren’t Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What’s the next move in this campaign, what’s the next campaign? Isn’t there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It’s where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it’s for their sake that you’re involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

#### No root cause of war – focus on the particulars instead

Gat 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed, locked for decades in ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts; this conceptual confusion is untangled and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

#### Reps reflect material reality

Mearsheimer 1995 John Mearsheimer (International Relations professor at the University of Chicago) 1995 The False Promise of International Institutions in International Security Vol 19 Number 3 Winter, pp 43-44.

The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transna- tional networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selfected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." 156 Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" 157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the chal- lenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost never realized in practice."

#### Discursive focus generates epistemological blind spots and wont alter security structures

Adrian Hyde-Price (Professor of International Politics at Bath) 2001 “Europes new security challenges” p. 39

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed bgy politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it isimportant to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

#### \*\*\*Psychoanalysis is a non-falsifiable joke – prefer predictions and explanations based on empiricism and evidence\*\*\*

Jerry A. **Coyne**, reviewing FOLLIES OF THE WISE by Frederick Crews, September 6, **2006**. http://tls.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25347-2345445,00.html

Laid out in the first four essays, Crews’s brief against Freud is hard to refute. Through Freud’s letters and documents, Crews reveals him to be not the compassionate healer of legend, but a cold and calculating megalomaniac, determined to go down in history as the Darwin of the psyche. Not only did he not care about patients (he sometimes napped or wrote letters while they were free-associating): there is no historical evidence that he effectively cured any of them. And the propositions of psychoanalysis have proven to be either untestable or falsified. How can we disprove the idea, for example, that we have a death drive? Or that dreams always represent wish fulfilments? When faced with counter-examples, Freudianism always proves malleable enough to incorporate them as evidence for the theory. Other key elements of Freudian theory have never been corroborated. There are no scientifically convincing experiments, for example, demonstrating the repression of traumatic memories. As Crews points out, work with survivors of the Holocaust and other traumatic episodes has shown not a single case in which such memories are quashed and then recovered. In four further essays, Crews documents the continuing pernicious influence of Freud in the “recovered memory” movement. The idea that childhood sexual abuse can be repressed and then recalled originated with Freud, and has been used by therapists to evoke false memories which have traumatized patients and shattered families. Realizing the scientific weaknesses of Freud, many diehards have taken the fall-back position that he was nevertheless a thinker of the first rank. Didn’t Freud give us the idea of the unconscious, they argue? Well, not really, for there was a whole history of pre-Freudian thought about people’s buried motives, including the writings of Shakespeare and Nietzsche. The “unconscious” was a commonplace of Romantic psychology and philosophy. And those who champion Freud as a philosopher must realize that his package also includes less savoury items like penis envy, the amorality of women, and our Lamarckian inheritance of “racial memory”. The quality of Crews’s prose is particularly evident in his two chapters on evolution versus creationism. In the first, he takes on creationists in their new guise as intelligent-design advocates, chastising them for pushing not only bad science, but contorted faith: “Intelligent design awkwardly embraces two clashing deities – one a glutton for praise and a dispenser of wrath, absolution, and grace, the other a curiously inept cobbler of species that need to be periodically revised and that keep getting snuffed out by the very conditions he provided for them. Why, we must wonder, would the shaper of the universe have frittered away some fourteen billion years, turning out quadrillions of useless stars, before getting around to the one thing he really cared about, seeing to it that a minuscule minority of earthling vertebrates are washed clean of sin and guaranteed an eternal place in his company?” But after demolishing creationists, Crews gives peacemaking scientists their own hiding, reproving them for trying to show that there is no contradiction between science and theology. Regardless of what they say to placate the faithful, most scientists probably know in their hearts that science and religion are incompatible ways of viewing the world. Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict.Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

#### \*\*\*Aff creates a colonialism of the psyche that silences the subject by psychoanalytically attempting to remove its ‘primitive’ aspects—your author agrees

Celia **Brickman** (clinical, faculty and research member of the Center for Religion and Psychotherapy of Chicago) **2003** “Aboriginal Populations in the Mind: Race and Primitivity in Psychoanalysis” p. 192-193.

But a subjectivity (psychoanalytically conceived of as) emerging through separation and exclusion produces an excluded remainder—the primitive/maternal as the matrix of undifferentiated being—that becomes identified with actual gendered and raced others who are held to be both psychologically and socially inferior. Lacanian, Kristevan, and object relations perspectives all posit subjectivity as founded through separations, exclusions, and repressions, which in turn presuppose an initial stage of infancy in which the infant cannot distinguish between self and other, between self and surround: they all posit a period of undifferentiated immersion in the natural and maternal relationship from which the subject must separate. To this we may juxtapose Freud's contention that the historical/evolutionary emergence of individual subjectivity was effected by separation from submergence in the social ties of primary identification and enthrallment that held primitive communities together, constituting a "group mind" in which group members lacked individuality, which is to say they were undifferentiated from one another. In both cases, what is separated from or excluded becomes repressed but continues to threaten the subject via regression to an annihilating absorption in primitive/maternal undifferentiation. Theories that see the subject as formed through separation and exclusion require the prior hypothesis of this preexisting undifferentiation, which is identified with the maternal in a developmental register; and which, through the psychoanalytic identification of maternity with primitivity, is identified with the primitive in an evolutionary register. **In this preexisting undifferentiation we can see**, in Homi Bhabha's words**, "**the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated origin" with which the " 'official knowledges' of colonialism .. are imbricated."93 **Development is then conceived in terms of the distance effected by separation from and repudiation of a relationship of undifferentiation with mother/nature/primitivity**, through the mediation of the father/civilizing law. Particularly in the Lacanian-derived accounts, the very possibility of achieving subjectivity, of participating in the representational structures that govern one's existence, is predicated on a repudiation or splitting off of the maternal, primitive**,** abjectedelements of the psyche. This repudiation is figured as the crucial operation necessary to the attainment of cultural legibility; it is figured as inevitable, universal, and ahistoric. As Butler writes, from this perspective it seems that there is no possibility of speaking, of taking a position in language outside of differentiating moves, not only through a differentiation from the maternal which is said to install a speaker in language for the first time, but [through] further differentiations among speakers positioned within kinship." **The laws of language and subjectivity** appear to be part of **an unavoidable prison** of gender and racial asymmetry: if one tries to escape the repudiation of the primitive/maternal one refuses the possibility of speaking, of being heard, of becoming a subject at all.

#### \*\*\*Disavowal of subjectivity is nihilism

Caputo 74 (Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought: Part One Caputo, John D. Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 12, Number 4, October 1974, pp. 479-494 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0792; project muse)

I. HEIDEGGER AND MEDIEVAL MYSTICISM In the "Introduction" to his habilitation dissertation at Freiburg, The Doctrine 01 Categories and of Meaning in Duns Scotus (1916), the young Heidegger praised the "objective" orientation of medieval philosophy: "Scholastic psychology, precisely inasmuch as it is not focussed upon the dynamic and flowing reality of the psychical remains in its fundamental problems oriented towards the objective and noematic, a circumstance which greatly favors setting one's sight on the phenomenon of intentionality" (DS, 15). 1 While modern philosophy is characterized by a keen sense of subjective experience, the Scholastic thinker is concerned primarily with the object of knowledge, with "being." The Scholastic, he says, is typified by an "absolute surrender" to the "content" of knowledge (DS, 7). In a sentence which is prophetic in the light of what he would later call the "subject matter of thinking" (die Sache des Denkens) Heidegger observes: "The value of the subject matter [Sache] (object) dominates over the value of the self (subject)" (DS, 7). Because thinking "tends into" (intendere) being, the medievals spoke of the "intentional" character of knowledge. Thus the Scholastics' neglect of subjective experience at least kept them free of the "unphilosophy of psychologism" (DS, 14). Heidegger found in the medievals an anticipation of the work of Husserl, who would come to Freiburg this same year (1916) and whose Logical Investigations he had been studying for some time (SD, 82). Both Husserl and the author of De modis significandf 2 reject the reduction of the laws of logic to the empirical constitution of the human mind; both seek a "pure" grammar which delineates unchanging relationships between the parts of speech and which holds true a priori of every possible empirical language (DS, 149-150). The simple but challenging task for thinking in the medieval world was to subordinate the "individuality of the individual" (DS, 7) to the demands of the subject matter, to its unchanging structures and "objective meanings." That is why one can read through the great Summae of the thirteenth century without once catching a glimpse of the personalities of their authors. But it would be a mistake, Heidegger contends, to think that behind the objectivity and formalism of the Scholastic there is nothing "living." On the contrary, "the theoretical posture of the spirit is only one" of its possible attitudes and perhaps not even the most important (DS, 236). Hence the text we cited above continues: In order to reach a decisive insight into this fundamental character of scholastic psychology, I consider a philosophical, or more exactly, a phenomenological examination of the mystical, moral theological and ascetical literature of medieval scholasticism to be especially urgent. In such a way alone will one push forward to what is living in the life of medieval scholasticism . . . . (DS, 15) Behind the impersonal disputations of the scholastics there is the life of the soul which seeks God in the practice of morality and asceticism. The speculative theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages is not opposed to its mystical tradition but rather expresses in a conceptual way what the mystic has experienced: If one reflects on the deeper essence of philosophy in its character as a philosophy of world-views, then the conception of the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages as a scholasticism which stands in opposition to the contemporaneous mysticism must be exposed as fundamentally wrong. In the medieval world-view, scholasticism and mysticism belong essentially together. The two pairs of "opposites" rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-mysticism do not coincide. And where their equivalence is sought, it rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. Philosophy as a rationalist creation, detached from life, is powerless; mysticism as an irrationalist experience is purposeless. (DS 241) Philosophy is the conceptualization of what the living historical man experiences. And for the young Heidegger, the experience of the mystic is the experience of medieval man intensified and "writ large."